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Abstract
We used an internet-based survey platform to conduct a cross-sectional survey regard-
ing the impact of COVID-19 on the LGBTQ + population in the United States. While this 
method of data collection was quick and inexpensive, the data collected required extensive 
cleaning due to the infiltration of bots. Based on this experience, we provide recommen-
dations for ensuring data integrity. Recruitment conducted between May 7 and 8, 2020 
resulted in an initial sample of 1251 responses. The Qualtrics survey was disseminated 
via social media and professional association listservs. After noticing data discrepancies, 
research staff developed a rigorous data cleaning protocol. A second wave of recruitment 
was conducted on June 11–12, 2020 using the original recruitment methods. The five-step 
data cleaning protocol led to the removal of 773 (61.8%) surveys from the initial dataset, 
resulting in a sample of 478 participants in the first wave of data collection. The protocol 
led to the removal of 46 (31.9%) surveys from the second two-day wave of data collection, 
resulting in a sample of 98 participants in the second wave of data collection. After verify-
ing the two-day pilot process was effective at screening for bots, the survey was reopened 
for a third wave of data collection resulting in a total of 709 responses, which were iden-
tified as an additional 514 (72.5%) valid participants and led to the removal of an addi-
tional 194 (27.4%) possible bots. The final analytic sample consists of 1090 participants. 
Although a useful and efficient research tool, especially among hard-to-reach populations, 
internet-based research is vulnerable to bots and mischievous responders, despite survey 
platforms’ built-in protections. Beyond the depletion of research funds, bot infiltration 
threatens data integrity and may disproportionately harm research with marginalized popu-
lations. Based on our experience, we recommend the use of strategies such as qualitative 
questions, duplicate demographic questions, and incentive raffles to reduce likelihood of 
mischievous respondents. These protections can be undertaken to ensure data integrity and 
facilitate research on vulnerable populations.
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1 Introduction
Internet-based research is becoming an increasingly useful tool for data collection, as it 
reduces the time needed to recruit participants and the number of staff needed for data 
collection (Das et  al. 2018; McMaster et  al. 2017; Schonlau and Couper 2017; Selm 
and Jankowski 2006). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic halted most in-person research 
activities precisely when novel research became most necessary. In order to conduct 
research on intersections of COVID-19 and social, economic, and health effects, numer-
ous researchers turned to internet-based survey platforms (e.g., Qualtrics, SurveyMon-
key, REDCap) to conduct research remotely. Given the future wave of peer-reviewed 
research using internet-based data collection methods, it is essential to ensure the integ-
rity of these data.
Internet-based survey platforms are inexpensive, quick, and accessible ways to col-
lect data. These mechanisms have been used to conduct research among rural popu-
lations (Campbell et  al. 2018; Bowen and Ball 2020), sex workers (Thng et  al. 2018; 
Bond et al. 2019), people who use substances (Schmidt et al. 2016; Sanchez et al. 2018), 
LGBTQ + populations (Guillory et al. 2018; McInroy 2016; Stults et al. 2017), and social 
justice movements (Harvey 2017). Internet-based research is especially useful when con-
ducting studies among marginalized populations or those deemed “hard to reach”, as they 
minimize burdens of travel and time (Das et  al. 2018; McMaster et  al. 2017; Schonlau 
and Couper 2017; Selm and Jankowski 2006). Furthermore, internet-based surveys offer 
anonymity to participants who may be less comfortable disclosing personal information 
or information about illegal activities (Das et al. 2018; Thng et al. 2018; Bond et al. 2019; 
Schmidt et al. 2016; Sanchez et al. 2018). This is especially important for adolescent popu-
lations who have not disclosed their sexual orientation or gender identity and who may 
live with family or friends that would not be supportive (Sterzing et al. 2018). Individuals 
who do not feel comfortable participating in face-to-face research are often the most under-
represented in the population of interest and internet-based research offers them an anony-
mous medium to participate in research as well as allowing researchers an opportunity to 
more fully explore the needs of the most vulnerable within marginalized populations (Ster-
zing et al. 2018; Russomanno et al. 2019; Iribarren et al. 2018).
Despite internal safety protocols and data protection mechanisms built into these survey 
platforms (i.e. ballot box stuffing, bot detection, and reCAPTCHA), it remains extremely 
difficult to protect against bot infiltration of online survey research (Simone 2019). Bots, 
defined as computer software designed to perform automated tasks for users (Nwana 1996; 
Eslahi et  al. 2012; Teitcher et  al. 2015), can be created or downloaded within minutes 
and deployed to complete simple automated functions or find surveys offering incentives 
(Yarrish et al. 2019; Godinho et al. 2020). It is important to note that this is not simply a 
human versus bot issue; rather human respondents are creating bots to complete surveys 
en masse for financial gain (Pozzar et  al. 2020) as well as using other technology such 
as virtual private networks (VPN) and virtual private servers (VPS) to bypass safeguards 
against ballot box stuffing (Dennis et al. 2020). In addition to concerns about data integrity, 
researchers face an ethical dilemma about the accidental misuse of research funds to pay 
for bot responses with money reserved for participant incentives. This is an area of growing 
concern as federal funds for scientific research continue to decrease (Teitcher et al. 2015). 
Tools like reCAPTCHA offer additional protections against bot infiltrations, but are easily 
manipulated, and eligibility screeners can be easily deciphered with the necessary skills 
and time (Yarrish et al. 2019; Godinho et al. 2020).
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The infiltration of bots into internet-based research is fairly commonplace and may 
evade detection by research staff, especially if the staff are unaware of the existence of bots, 
their function, and the potential impact (Yarrish et al. 2019; Godinho et al. 2020; Buchanan 
and Scofield 2018). Bot creation is a lucrative form of income, with incentives acting as a 
reward for bot creation (Yarrish et al. 2019). If data are not closely monitored, bots may 
complete hundreds of surveys before the activity is detected (Yarrish et  al. 2019; God-
inho et al. 2020; Buchanan and Scofield 2018) and may exhaust research funds allocated to 
incentives while leaving researchers with unusable data.
When considering both the increased reliance on internet-based surveys and the ease 
with which bots are created, it remains unclear whether internet-based survey platforms 
are helpful or harmful to research. This is especially relevant to research conducted with 
marginalized populations, for whom internet-based research may be more vulnerable to 
bot infiltration and other “mischievous responders” (Cimpian et  al. 2018). Mischievous 
responders have been defined as survey respondents who intentionally mislead researchers 
by providing untruthful responses to survey items (Cimpian et  al. 2018). Internet-based 
survey platforms may not uplift the voices of marginalized populations, instead further 
suppressing these voices by reducing data integrity.
Our survey was designed to understand the impact of COVID-19 on lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ +) communities in the Unites States. The pur-
pose of this brief report is to highlight the problems associated with conducting research 
using internet-based survey platforms and to propose that researchers who conduct internet 
survey research implement a multi-faceted approach to preserving data integrity including 
changes to participant incentives as well as data cleaning protocols to help identify and 
remove bot-based responses.
2  Methods
2.1  Study design
A cross-sectional, internet-based study was conducted from May to July 2020 to under-
stand the effects of COVID-19 on LGBTQ + populations in the United States. Eligible par-
ticipants were 18 years or older, LGBTQ-identified, and lived in the U.S or U.S territories. 
The survey included measures assessing demographics, substance use, sexual behavior, 
intimate partner violence, mental health, general health, HIV status, medication adherence, 
healthcare access, and COVID-19. Email addresses were recorded in a separate Qualtrics 
survey to facilitate delivery of incentives. The link to the incentive survey was only made 
available at the end of the COVID-19 survey. To ensure all COVID-19 surveys were anon-
ymous and confidential, we were not able to collect email addresses in the same survey. 
The [BLINDED] Institutional Review Board approved the study protocol.
Research staff conducted internet-based recruitment in stages through professional 
organizations’ email listservs, institutional social media accounts, and personal social 
media accounts. All recruitment advertising mentioned that the study was focused on the 
experiences of LGBTQ + people and COVID-19 but was left intentionally vague around 
eligibility for the study beyond sexual orientation and gender identity to ensure that 
respondents could not complete the screener questions with eligible responses. Recruit-
ment posts referenced a $5 electronic gift card for survey completion. Interested partici-
pants answered several screener questions at the beginning of the Qualtrics survey and, if 
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eligible, provided tacit consent prior to enrollment. After completing the COVID-19 sur-
vey, participants were directed to a separate survey to enter their email address for compen-
sation. Participants could also complete the survey and opt out of the incentive.
2.2  Bot detection and protection
The detection of bots and the protection of data quality is a tri-fold process that includes 
intentional design choices for the survey, recruitment, and data cleaning steps. Sepa-
rately, neither of these three steps are sufficient to reduce the number of bots; however, 
taken together the three processes create a strong protocol for reducing the number of bots 
who take internet-based surveys and removing the bot responses that bypass the other pro-
cesses. For surveys, there are a number of built in survey protection settings across sur-
vey platforms. While Qualtrics survey protection settings, such as prevent ballot box stuff-
ing (a tool that places a cookie in the browser once a person has submitted a response), 
reCAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart) scores (a question placed prior to the survey asking the respondent to identify cer-
tain items in pictures or replicate a series of letters), bot detection (a Qualtrics survey ques-
tion that indicates a reCAPTCHA score that relates to the probability that the respondent 
is a bot), and HTTP referer verification (an option that verifies all responses come from 
a specific link) were activated at the launch of the survey, sophisticated bots were able to 
bypass these protective measures. Data were collected in two waves, before and after bot-
detection. Initially, research staff conducted recruitment between May 7 and 8. Discrepan-
cies in numbers of completed COVID-19 and incentive surveys prompted staff to pause 
recruitment and examine these inconsistencies, with the latter being much higher indicat-
ing that bots had specifically targeted the incentive survey. Creating two separate surveys 
and thereby unlinking the data from the incentive survey proved to be an effective strategy 
to reduce the likelihood of bots compromising the integrity of the data but offered no pro-
tection from depleting the research funds designated for participant incentives. Once the 
initial data were purged of bot-responses, as described below, the research team dissemi-
nated the survey again over an initial two-day trial period between June 11 and 12, using 
the same venues as in the initial recruitment.
2.3  Changes to recruitment
The second process to remove internet bots involves changing recruitment strategies. 
Prior to launching the second wave, the following protections were implemented. First, we 
changed the incentive structure such that, instead of a guaranteed $5 gift card, participants 
would enter a raffle for one of ten $100 gift cards. To prevent bots designed to identify 
incentive surveys, recruitment materials did not mention the gift card’s value. Second, hid-
den questions were included throughout the survey by using the hide jQuery method in 
the edit question JavaScript function available through Qualtrics for the specific questions. 
Humans would not see the question, but bots could fill in an answer since the bots may 
not be designed to read JavaScript. Third, demographic questions were randomly repeated 
throughout the survey to check for consistency. Finally, non-U.S. IP addresses were filtered 
to a separate survey.
In addition to the data cleaning protocol, we developed a data integrity protocol that 
helped prevent bots from taking the survey as well as to identify non-human responses. 
The first step was to change participant incentives for completing the survey. In the first 
Ensuring survey research data integrity in the era of internet…
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wave of the survey, the first 200 participants were offered a $5 electronic gift card. In the 
second wave of the survey, participants were entered into a raffle to win one of ten $100 
gift cards. Although the amount allocated for participant incentives did not change, the 
number of bot responses that completed the survey decreased from 633 in the first release 
to 23 in the second release. This change in incentive strategy was the most effective tool to 
disincentivize bot-based responses.
2.4  Data cleaning
The third process to protect data from internet bots was a two-part data cleaning plan.. 
For the COVID-19 survey, the research team developed a five-step data integrity protocol. 
First, we removed responses that did not complete at least 60% of the survey. Second, we 
used Google’s invisible reCAPTCHA V3 to identify possible bots, which protects against 
bots and other automated programs by grading users based off a series of criteria, such as 
typing speed and number of requests from IP addresses (Google Developers 2020; Qual-
trics 2021). We removed responses with a reCAPTCHA score of less than 0.5 from Goog-
le’s reCAPTCHA V3 as suggested by the Google’s developer guide (Google Developers 
2020; Qualtrics 2021). Third, we removed outlier response times, defined as under 5 and 
over 30 min. We selected this time limits based on the average time it took study staff to 
completed the survey during the pilot testing of the survey. During this process, the aver-
age time for completion of the survey was 12.9 min (SD = 6.1). Fourth, we removed any 
responses to the qualitative survey question “How has coronavirus (COVID-19) affected 
your life? Please tell us as much as you feel comfortable sharing.” that were exact dupli-
cates. It should be noted that a simple logical response check is not sufficient for detect-
ing bot responses as many bots are capable of providing logical responses to qualitative 
questions similar to chatbots (Augello et al. 2017). Finally, the remaining responses were 
checked for conflicting data. These included demographic inconsistencies (e.g., those who 
reported their sex assigned at birth as male and their gender identity as transgender male) 
and population discrepancies (e.g., those who reported living in a rural area and reported 
a ZIP code in a large city). Methods of detecting internal consistency, such as Even–Odd 
consistency and examining for straightlining (Kim et al. 2019; Ward and Pond 2015), were 
not used in the data cleaning process for bots because the order of answer choices for most 
questions were randomized.
For the incentive survey, the research staff developed a four-step process to preserve 
data integrity and ensure actual participants received incentives. First, we removed email 
address that already received compensation. Second, we removed responses that included 
duplicate email or IP addresses (Dennis et al. 2020). It is important to note that users were 
able submit multiple email addresses and use a VPN or VPS to change their IP addresses. 
Third, two trained research staff independently identified potential bots from the list of sub-
mitted emails, using the following protocol based on the research teams observations: the 
email address should not appear as random letters and the email addresses should not end 
in numbers exceeding four digits as these characteristics are an indication of a bot gener-
ated email address and had similar characteristics of examples from Gmail bulk account 
creators that can be built or bought online (Wang et  al. 2017). In the final step, a third 
researcher checked for discrepancies between the lists and made final determinations 
regarding if the email was a human or bot. Gift cards were distributed to the final list of 
human-designated email addresses. It is important to note that eligible participants may 
have been incorrectly excluded from the incentive, however, participants at the beginning 
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of each survey were given our email address if they had any issues with the survey or 
receiving their expected incentive. To date, we have not received any inquiries about miss-
ing incentives.
3  Results
During the initial two-day recruitment period (Wave 1), the COVID-19 survey had a total 
of 1286 respondents, with 1251 (97.3%) eligible responses and 35 ineligible responses 
(2.7%). The incentive survey had more responses than the COVID-19 survey (n = 1348), 
an indicator that bots and/or mischievous respondents were bypassing the survey protec-
tion settings. For eligible responses, the total time to complete the survey ranged from 
0.13 to 955 min (M = 17.99, SD = 35.84). Table 1 describes the changes in the number of 
responses as a result of the cleaning plan, across each of the steps of data cleaning for both 
waves of the COVID-19 survey. For the incentive survey, a total of 1348 email addresses 
were recorded. Table 1 describes the changes in the number of responses as a result of the 
cleaning plan. Overall, a total of 719 (86.0%) respondents were identified as bots and 170 
(14.0%) identified as humans.
4  Discussion
This study contributes to the limited knowledge of bot behavior during internet-based sur-
vey research. As technology becomes more widely available and the average computer lit-
eracy of individuals increases, bot detection will become an increasingly larger threat to 
the integrity of peer-reviewed literature. Despite the threats posed by bot-based responses, 
researchers should not reject the idea of conducting internet based research. With addi-
tional considerations around an integrated approach to survey design, recruitment, and 
data cleaning that reduces the number of bots able to complete the survey and protocols to 
remove the bot-based responses from the data set, internet-based research remains an effec-
tive tool to engage hard to reach populations in research. This study offers a blueprint data 
cleaning protocol for future internet-based research studies.
Our findings indicate that the built-in data safety mechanisms are not a sufficient deter-
rent to bots from accessing surveys. Although we used the enhanced settings in Qualtrics, 
including reCAPTCHA technology, 773 (61.8%) of our survey respondents were identi-
fied as bots in our data integrity protocol. Bots were able to circumvent survey protection 
mechanisms such as prevention of ballot stuffing and use of HTTP referrers to protect the 
incentive survey. Due to the limitations of automated bot-detection software, the research 
team developed the following human checks for our data integrity protocol.
A large portion of our data-integrity protocol relied on a qualitative survey ques-
tion where we asked the participants about other issues related to COVID-19 and the 
LGBTQ + community. Although we did not require an answer to this question, it proved 
essential in helping identify bot responses as we identified 88 (13.3%) bots in the form of 
exact duplicate responses that most likely would not happen by chance. However, we note 
that we cannot be certain that all duplicate responses were from bots. One example of an 
exact duplicate response was: “As a result of social isolation, coronavirus has reduced my 
working hours, reduced my income and shortage of living materials “, which was sub-
mitted for 11 different observations. The utility of qualitative items for bot detection is 
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confirmed by the extant literature. An online research study utilized an open-ended ques-
tion with a three-character-minimum response and found no illogical responses indicative 
of bots. Only 17 of the 308 recorded responses “skipped” the question using spaces or 
periods, indicating that bots were likely unable to bypass the qualitative item (Yarrish et al. 
2019). To help identify bot responses in the future, researchers should build in multiple 
qualitative questions and consider making one of them a requirement for submitting the 
survey.
Another useful check was to ask for the same data point in multiple formats. For our 
study, we relied on the reported ZIP Code and population size of the place where the 
respondent lived. Overall, we identified 57 (9.9%) bot responses from this step in our data 
integrity protocol. While there is the possibility for misclassification of population size 
by individual respondents, this will likely result in the exclusion of only a few responses. 
Similar to our assessment of demographic discrepancies, other researchers have used dupli-
cate gender identity questions to trigger a logic check for subsequent data. Researchers at 
the University of Minnesota identified bot-based responses from individuals who indicated 
that they were cisgender and answered questions about trans identity, as the bots were fol-
lowing underlying code rather than survey logic (Perkel 2020). We recommend the use of 
redundant demographic measures (e.g., assessing both ZIP code and self-reported popula-
tion of area) and checking for responses to “hidden” questions.
In the second wave of our data collection process, we implemented the same data integ-
rity protocol and have only detected a minimal number of possible bots. Additionally, the 
change to our incentives was crucial. While a $5 gift card may not appear to be coercive, 
the cumulative value accrued by bots becomes a lucrative way to earn an income. Given 
that an average bot can be coded and repurposed to take different Qualtrics surveys or pre-
built (e.g., using websites like http:// ultim atesu rveyb ot. com/), the return on investment for 
a technologically savvy person is considerable. The simple change in our protocol from 
offering a $5 gift card for every completed survey and mentioning the amount in recruit-
ment materials to raffling ten $100 gift cards without mentioning the amount dramatically 
reduced the proportion of bot responses during the initial and second two-day recruitment 
periods. Other studies have found that careful dissemination of participation incentives 
may dissuade bots, specifically if recruitment was exclusively in venues where individu-
als are more likely to take the survey in good faith (Yarrish et al. 2019). Furthermore, we 
specifically did not use social media advertising to expand the reach of our survey. While 
this lowers the total sample, it also helps reduce the number of bot responses by limit-
ing the sample to a known network of LGBTQ + related virtual spaces. This is especially 
important when research is conducted with niche populations as bots can determine inclu-
sion criteria responses fairly quickly (Sterzing et al. 2018; Russomanno et al. 2019; Iribar-
ren et  al. 2018). The results of our study and the available literature suggest that future 
internet-based research should implement raffle-based incentive structures to prevent bot 
infiltration.
4.1  Limitations
This study is not without limitations. The main limitation is that we could not analyze 
the exact effect of the change in reimbursement structure, as we had a lower number of 
respondents in the second wave, attributable to the large number of bot responses in the 
first wave. Additionally, since we utilized the same recruitment methods, most of the indi-
viduals who were interested in participating likely did so in the first wave. Despite the 
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lower number of human participants, the non-existence of bot-based responses is a strength 
of our second-wave data collection methodology.
5  Conclusion
As researchers use the internet to conduct studies with increasingly limited funding and 
in precarious situations, it is imperative that data integrity protocols be included in the 
study design from the beginning. By randomizing participant incentives and proactively 
building in data integrity verification questions, researchers can more effectively limit the 
number of and more easily identify bot responses included in the data. Furthermore, future 
peer-reviewed literature of internet-based research should clearly detail data integrity pro-
tocols and provide data on the identified and excluded bot responses. As internet research 
becomes more common, researchers across disciplines have the opportunity to create a 
vast collection of bot detection methodologies that serve us as researchers and science as a 
whole.
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